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TRUTH-TELLING, INCOMMENSURABILITY, AND THE
ETHICS OF GRADING
Gary Chartier*
As every teacher knows, grades matter to students. It is
not altogether surprising that students sometimes bring
concerns about their grades to court. Student challenges to
institutional grading decisions have consistently been
unsuccessful. 1 Courts have characteristically been unwilling to
entertain such claims both because of their perceived trivialitl
and because judges lack "the authority... [and] the expertise to
prescribe academic standards ... "3 On the other hand, "[n]o
teacher has a fundamental right to hand in random or skewed
grades .... "4 An educational institution has a legally recognized
interest "in ensuring that its students receive a fair grade,"5
and it is difficult to see why students might not be thought in
principle to have a similar interest. Fairness issues arise with
particular force when they concern, not subjective grading
decisions made by instructors about individual student
exercises, but rather general policies adopted by instructors
and institutions. It would be unreasonable for a judge to
assume under ordinary circumstances that she could improve
on a teacher's judgment regarding the merits of an essay
prepared for an English class. However, it might be easier for

'* Assistant Professor of Business Ethics and Law, La Sierra University. PhD,
University of Cambridge, 1991; JD, University of California at Los Angeles, 2001. I am
grateful to Alexander Lian, Craig Kinzer, and Linn Tonstad for their characteristically
thoughtful, perceptive, and critical observations on earlier versions of this article; to
Elissa Kido for the chance to discuss the issues with which it is concerned during its
development; to Annette Bryson, Eva Pascal, and Vittorio Trionfi for their willingness
to review it; and to Carole Pateman for welcome opportunities for dialob'Ue and
exchange.
1. See e.g., Dilworth u. Dallas Community College Dist., 81 F.3d 616 (5th Cir.
1996); Attia u. Keller, 703 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); Rayman u. Alvord Indep. School
Dist., 6:~9 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1981).
2. Raymon, 639 F.2d 257.
3. Axelrod u. Phillips Acad., 46 F. Supp. 2d 72, 82 (D. Mass. 1999).
4. Wozniak u. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2001).
5. Keen u. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 258 (7th Cir. 1992)
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the judge to assess the appropriateness of a policy calling for a
reduction in the grade of any student who has, for instance,
consumed alcohol; "[l]ess judicial deference, although still a
considerable amount, is due those 'academic' decisions
concerning academic and pedagogical policies of the university
as to which reasonable educators can and do differ."6 In 1983,
the Texas Court of Appeals rejected the claim that "the practice
of reducing grades for nonacademic disciplinary reasons was
constitutionally unreasonable and impermissible."7 However,
other judges have not viewed this practice so kindly. "The final
grade constitutes a record that purports to measure academic
attainment," wrote a dissenting judge in the 1976 Illinois case
of Knight v. Board of Education. 8 "[P]rospective employers as
well as institutions of higher learning concern themselves with
true academic achievement,"9 he observed, thus implying that
grades are expected to serve as sources of information about
academic performance rather than moral character. Similarly
a federal district court concluded, in Smith v. School City of
Hobart, that:
[f]or college entrance and other purposes. . . [a
substantial grade reduction for nonacademic reasons]
would result in a clear misrepresentation of the
student's scholastic achievement. Misrepresentation of
achievement is equally improper and, we think, illegal
whether the achievement is misrepresented by
upgrading or by downgrading, if either is done for
reasons that are irrelevant to the achievement being
graded. For example, one would hardly deem acceptable
an upgrading in a mathematics course for achievement
10
on the playing field.
On this basis, the court found that a "rule that calls for a grade
reduction to discipline nonacademic conduct is illegal, and null
and void." 11
While courts may, in general, continue to decline to hear
6. Thomas A. Schweitzer, Academic Challenge Cases: Should Judicial Review
Extend to Academic Evaluations of Students, 41 Am. U.L. Rev. (1993).
7. New Braunfels Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Armke, 658 S.W.2d. 330, 331 (Tex. App. 1983)
8. Knight v. Bd. of Educ., 348 N.E.2d 299, 305 (Ill. App. 1976). According to the
Knight majority, a policy that precluded instructor discretion might "justify court
intervention."
9. !d. at 303.
10. Smith v. Sch. City of Hobart, 811 F.Supp. 391,397-98 (1993).
11. !d. at 399.
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grading-related cases, and while there are surely good reasons
for them to refuse to do so, legal disputes over academic
evaluation will undoubtedly continue. 12 A variety of legal
theories support the conclusion that judicial assessment of
13
some educational decisions is appropriate. The law of contract
has provided perhaps the firmest basis for students' claims. 14 A
plausible contractual argument can be made that "[a]
registered student has a legally protected interest in his college
education," 15 and that when she enrolls, "a student ... expects
that the school [at which she registers] will treat her fairly,"
which means, among other things, that she will not be
subjected to "arbitrary grading." 16
The number of cases in which courts ought to entertain
claims about academic evaluations are few, but normative
questions about grading policies are frequent and unavoidable.
Lawyers and judges may only rarely need to think critically
and reflectively about the basis for grading policies;
instructors, institutions, and students need to do so far more
often. My goal here is not to determine what legal issues
related to grading deserve consideration by the courts, but
rather to articulate a normative framework that might
reasonably guide assessments of the reasonableness of grading
policies. My central contention is that an instructor has an
obligation to grade accurately, to give to each student a grade
that reflects the student's competence with respect to the
subject matter of the course rather than any other factor. She
should do so in accordance with what I call the principle of
academic exclusivity (PAE), which requires that, as far as
possible, all nonacademic factors be excluded from
consideration when instructors determine grades. 17 In this
12. See Jayme L. Butcher, Comment, MIT v. Yoo: Revocation of Academic Degrees
for Nonacademic Reasons, 51 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 749 (2001); Curtis J. Berger &
Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student,
99 Colum. L. Rev. 289 (1999); Dina Lalla, Student Challenges to Grade and Academic
Dismissals: Are They Losing Battles?, 18 J.C. & U.L. 577 (1992).
13. See Berger, supra n. 11, at 291 nn. 4-6 for a range of alternatives.
14. !d. at 291-292. Berger and Berger are concerned with discipline rather than
grading and might well not endorse the conclusions for which I argue in this article.
15. !d. at 291.
16. Id. at 318.
17. The PAE embodies (at least some of) what Gregory F. Weis calls "the
conventional view of grading." See Gregory F. Weis, Grading, 18 Teaching Philos. 3
(1995). The "conventional view," for instance, "takes no account of what the student has
had to do, of how hard the student has had to work." !d. at 10. It also "ignores the
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essay, I elaborate and defend this principle, explaining that it
is rooted in two simple obligations: first, a duty to tell the
truth, and second, to respect the incommensurability of subjectmatter competence.
I suggest reasons we ought to be
suspicious of two alternative positions, which I label academic
consequentialism and academic retributivism.
And I argue
that the PAE renders a number of common grading practices
inappropriate because these practices take into account factors
other than students' subject-matter competence (SMC). 18 These
factors, I suggest, are relevant to the broader goals of
education, and it is entirely appropriate that institutions
evaluate students' performance with respect to many, perhaps
all, of them. Student behaviors and character traits unrelated
to SMC are certainly the business of educational institutions.
However, any institutional evaluation of student performance
that does not directly facilitate the estimation of SMC should
not influence students' grades. Grades should reflect SMC
alone.
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF ACADEMIC EXCLUSIVITY
The principle of academic exclusivity, the theory that
grades should reflect only a student's SMC, follows from the
duty
to
(a) tell
the
truth
and
(b) respect
the
incommensurability of SMC and a variety of other factors that
sometimes influence students' grades.
A. The PAE and Truth-Telling
There is a general obligation to avoid deception-the
intentional creation or encouragement of false beliefs in
others. 19 The obligation to avoid deception to tell the truth

classroom experience itself as a factor in a student's grade," and thus implicitly
precludes taking attendance and participation into account. !d. My argument in this
article may be seen, in part, as an attempt to formalize this view and spell out its
implications.
18. See the detailed discussion of this concept, infra. Randall R. Curren, Coercion
and the Ethics of Grading and Testing, 45 Educ. Theory 425 (1995), uses language that
suggests the appropriateness of the expression "subject-matter competence," but I do
not believe he ever employs this expression himself. He says, for instance, that a
"student's act of signing up for. . . [aj course could be understood to entail an
admission of subject-specific and level-specific noncompetence." !d. at 435.
19. Perhaps the standard contemporary philosophical analysis of lying is Sissela
Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (Pantheon Books 1978). On "lying
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reflects the value of personal autonomy-avoiding deception is
a way of permitting each person to make up her own mind
about possible evaluations or courses of action. It also fosters
trust and community between people. Given this obligation,
instructors must give grades that accurately reflect students'
abilities in the subject matter taught.
A grade is accurate to the extent that it permits someone to
estimate the extent of a student's knowledge and skills in a
given area. It is inaccurate to the extent that it leads someone
to believe that she knows more or less than she does or that she
can do more or less than she can. A good grade is not justified
by a student's hard work; a poor grade is not justified by a
20
student's sloth. More generally, a grade is not warranted by a
judgment regarding a student's moral character, her
helpfulness or respectfulness in class, or anything apart from
her SMC. 21
Grades appear in general to offer academic rather than
personal information. 22 Giving a grade in a particular course is
and cunning. . las] forms of violence," see Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks For An Ethics
195-204 (David Pellauer trans., U. of Chicago Press 1992). According to Sartre, lying
represents the objectification and subjugation of the other. When I lie, I assert my
authority over the other; and once I have conceded that I can lie, I imply that I am her
or his master even if I do not exercise my imagined privilege. See also, Bernard Gert,
Morality: A New Justification oft he Moral Rules 126-27 (rev. ed. of The Moral Rules 2d
Torchbook ed., Oxford U. Press 1988); Leonard Nelson, System of Ethics 151-55
(Norbert Guterman trans., Yale U. Press 1956); Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 54-78
(lfarv. U. Press 1978); Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (U. of Chic. Press 1977);
Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (U. of Chi. Press 1978); and T.M. Scanlon, What
We Owe To Each Other (Belknap Press ofHarv. U. Press 1998).
20. I regretfully disagree--on this issue-with "luck egalitarianism" as described
and, on a qualified basis, defended by Francis Schrag, From Here to Equality: Grading
Policies for Egalitarians, 51 Educ. Theory 63 (2001). For the luck egalitarian, because
talent is a product of luck, we should minimize the effects of talent on social rewards.
"lllf a student who has produced a paper with enormous effort receives a higher grade
than a student who has produced a paper with little effort, this is just even when the
second paper is higher in equality than the first ... ?" !d. at 70. According to Schrag,
the luck egalitarian will emphasize that it is important to distinguish "grading the
paper" from "grading the student." !d. at 70. But (and Schrag appears to be sensitive
to this concern) we are interested in the paper precisely because we are interested in
the student. A transcript reader cares about a student's grade in a given class because
she wants to know something about the student's SMC, not because she's interested in
how much effort a student has expended.
21. As James Terwilliger, Assigning Grades-Philosophical Issues and Practical
Recommendations, 10 J. of Research & Dev. in Educ. 21, 22 (1977), observes, a grade is
not a reflection of "the amount ... (ofl 'effort' expended, the student's work habits,
attitude, character traits (honesty, dependability, etc.) nor personality traits (cheerful,
cooperative, etc.)''
22. Steven M. Cahn, Saints and Scamps: Ethics in Academia 107 n. 4 (Rowman &
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a communicative act that provides prospective employers and
educational institutions to which the student may apply with
information regarding the student's competence in the
particular subject matter of the course. 23 This understanding of
what a grade is supposed to do follows from the role grades
actually play in our society and the impersonal and generally
inflexible character of the processes by which they are
ordinarily interpreted. A human resources specialist or a
graduate school admissions committee chair reviewing a
student's transcript will likely understand a grade appearing
on the transcript as primarily an index of the student's
-l'
24
. per1ormance.
acad em1c
The fact that transcript readers know that nonacademic
factors may influence grades is often used to legitimize an
instructor's decision to base a grade on factors other than SMC.
Arguably, an instructor need not deceive most transcript
readers if she allows such factors to play a limited role in
determining a grade. 25 But there is still good reason for
educators to avoid basing grades on nonacademic factors in the
interest of accurate communication. Transcripts based solely

Littlefield 1986), plausibly argues that "[t]hose who believe it important to recognize
formally a student's level of effort or improvement should favor awarding
supplementary grades for these special purposes rather than seeking to distort the
recognized meaning of grades, thereby undermining their ordinary uses."
23. See Knight, 348 N.E.2d 299 at 302; Smith, 811 F. Supp. 391 at 397~398;
Schrag, supra n. 20, at 68~69, 72; Kenneth A. Strike & Jonas F. Soltis, The Ethics of
Teaching 25 (Teachers C. Press 1985); Cahn, supra n. 20, at 107 n 4. As these
examples suggest, the available empirical evidence regarding the assumptions people
make about the meanings of grades is largely anecdotal. One more rigorous empirical
inquiry adds somewhat to our understanding of the "consequential validity" of gradessee generally Patricia A. Bigham Baron, presentation, Consequential Validity for High
School Grades: What is the Meaning of Grades for Senders and Receivers (Am. Educ.
Research Assn., New Orleans, La., Apr. 24~28, 2000) ERIC 445051. For the idea of
consequential validity, see generally Samuel J. Messick, Validity, in Educational
Measurement 13, 13~103 (Robert L. Linn, 3d ed., Macmillan Publg. Co. 1989).
24. Schrag plausibly identifies as a desideratum "of any ethical grading policy"
the requirement that grades "not convey deceptive information to those who receive
them." He explains: "Grades typically send signals to a variety of audiences in addition
to the students themselves: prospective employers, college or graduate schools'
admissions committees, and parents include the most important. Most readers of
transcripts are likely to interpret grades and transcripts in fairly predictable ways.
When, for example, a college admissions committee sees high school transcripts
recording Jack as having earned a Bin world history and Jason an A in the same class,
committee members will infer that the quality of Jason's work was superior to Jack's."
Schrag, supra n. 20, at 68~69.
25. See Baron, supra n. 23, at 31~32.
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on academic performance are already difficult to interpret. 26
Transcript readers generally lack evidence regarding the
particular nonacademic factors at play in determining a
particular grade or the weight given to any of these factors. 27
And there appears to be no consensus among the diverse
groups of people who rely on the information contained in
transcripts regarding the weights they expect instructors will
give-or believe instructors should give-to nonacademic
factors when determining grades. The lack of a generally
agreed-upon set of factors other than SMC that may contribute
to the determination of grades clearly adds to the difficulties
already
associated
with
transcript
interpretation. 28
Assumptions about the appropriate use of nonacademic factors
in grading decisions are unsystematic and variable; those who
do not share an instructor's or institution's judgments about
the ways in which nonacademic factors should influence grades
will have difficulty disregarding the influence of these factors
when interpreting grades.
26. Craig Kinzer plausibly suggests that, in an ideal world, a transcript would
therefore include the mean, median, mode, and standard deviation for each course,
teacher, and department to which it refers, for a period from the year before to the year
after the one in which any course to which it refers was taken. As he notes, this would,
regrettably, be too much information to be contained conveniently in a conventional
transcript. Of course, web-based delivery of academic information might make
providing data like these possible. According to Steven Cahn, " ... at a number of
colleges, ... transcripts now include not only a student's course grade, but also the
average grade of all students in the course." Cahn, supra n. 22, at 31.
27. Suppose a student, Alex, receives an Fin a chemistry class because he may be
responsible for an explosion in a chemistry lab. "Course grades ... are normally based
on knowledge of subject matter. Anyone who sees Alex's transcript will conclude that
he failed to learn chemistry, not that he is being punished." Strike & Soltis, supra n.23,
at 25
28. See Baron, supra n. 23, at 13-14, 21, 28. Parents, high school students, high
school teachers, high school guidance counselors, and college admissions officers "are in
reasonable agreement about the meaning of grades. Furthermore, when these groups
look at a set of grades on a transcript and consider college aptitude, there is a lot of
similarity across groups." /d. at 27. However, it is possible that college admissions
officers "seem to read effort and improvement into grades and ... think these ought to
count .... " /d. at 28. Though admissions officers are evidently prepared to assume
that nonacademic factors influence grades, they seem to overestimate the impact of
these factors on grading decisions and they lack information that would help them
correct their somewhat inaccurate assumptions.
Baron's study provides no information regarding the behavior or assumptions
of college and university teachers, graduate school admissions officers, or employers of
any sort; I am inclined to hypothesize that the perceived and intended influence of
nonacademic factors declines at the baccalaureate and post-baccalaureate levels, and
that employers are less inclined than admissions officers to assume or prefer that
f.,'Tades reflect the influence of such nonacademic factors.
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An instructor assigning a grade that does not reflect a
student's SMC may not intend to deceive or to convey an
inaccurate message to others; she may do so believing that
transcript readers may understand the grade as she intends it:
a response to something other than the student's SMC. At
minimum, however, even if she does not intend to deceive, she
must understand the risk that she will be misunderstood but
be prepared to accept that risk because of some other good she
seeks to achieve by assigning an inaccurate grade. However,
the risk she is taking is great and the potential injury to the
student and to transcript readers is considerable.
An
application of the "Golden Rule" test-would she be prepared
for anyone else to suffer a comparable harm under similar
circumstances because of the operation of a general principle
permitting a choice like hers? Would she be prepared to suffer
29
similar harm herself? -might well lead her to doubt that her
action is justified.
Telling the truth when assigning grades means, at the very
best, reducing the influence of nonacademic factors to a
mm1mum. An instructor can reduce the risk of misleading
transcript readers even further by declining to base grades on
nonacademic factors at all. Even though some transcript
readers may expect grades to be based on nonacademic factors,
the odds of confused communication between instructors and
transcript readers are arguably lowest when instructors base
grades exclusively on SMC.

B. The PAE and Incommensurability
Some transcript readers may tolerate, or even welcome,
instructors' willingness to consider nonacademic factors when
determining grades. Taking such factors into account, even if
doing so has the potential to increase confusion or
misunderstanding is not always deceptive. However, there is a
further reason to base grades solely on SMC: academic and
nonacademic factors are incommensurable.
They are
sufficiently different that it makes no sense to measure them
on the same scale. There is nothing wrong with evaluating a
student's character-moral or otherwise-and communicating

29. On applying the Golden Rule test, see e.g. John Finnis, Commensuration and
Public Reason, in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason 215,
227-228 (Ruth Changed., Harv. U. Press 1997).
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the results of this evaluation to others; doing so may actually
be quite helpful to prospective employers and to other academic
institutions. However, an evaluation of a student's character is
not the same thing as an evaluation of her SMC. It is no more
meaningful to collapse the two than it would be to add a
student's height to her shoe size. 30
Recognizing the incommensurability of SMC and character
or moral conduct is no different than acknowledging that SMC
is not the same thing as a student's friendliness, good looks, or
willingness to offer money or sexual favors for a better grade.
One reason we as a society object to grades that are extorted in
return for money or sex is because we recognize the coercive
implications of such trades.
Just as importantly, we also
object to such actions because we believe that money, sex,
charm, and an agreeable temper aren't the same thing as, and
can't be combined with or collapsed into, SMC.
These
objections are different in nature, and fairness demands that
they be evaluated differently. Someone who believes that it is
inappropriate to give a student a good grade because she is
friendly on the view that friendliness is not the same thing as
SMC is logically committed to the view that it is also
inappropriate to give a student a good grade because she has
performed an act of tremendous bravery on a class trip, or
anywhere else. Taking incommensurability seriously means
keeping evaluations of everything other than SMC distinct
from grades.

C. Subject-matter Competence
Following the principle of academic exclusivity (PAE)
requires that grades reflect SMC. Educational institutions are
rightly concerned with all sorts of things other than SMC, and

30. On incommensurability, see e.g. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and
Practical Reasoning (Ruth Changed., Harv. U. Press 1997); Elizabeth Anderson, Value
in Ethics and Economics (Harv. U. Press 1993); Nola J. Heidlebaugh, Judgment,
Rhetoric, and the Problem of Incommensurability: Recalling Practical Wisdom (U. of
S.C. Press 2001); ,John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 95-97, 110-118,
131-132 (Oxford U. Press 1980).
An objector might suggest that scores on different kinds of exercises-essay and
multiple-choice examinations, say-are also incommensurable. And it is certainly true
that different kinds of exercises require students to exhibit somewhat different
cognitive skills. However, while commensuration of results from disparate exercises
need not be unfair, since all such exercises have in common the purpose of facilitating
the predicting SMC.
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they can and should find a range of mechanisms designed to
express their concerns.
The PAE simply dictates that
nonacademic concerns not be expressed using grades.
A student possesses SMC at a given level with respect to
the content of a Calculus I course, for instance, if she
understands the concepts explored in the course at the relevant
level and has mastered the skills the course is designed to help
her acquire at that level. Her actual academic performance is
not an infallible measure of her SMC. Performance on some
exercises has no tendency to tell us about SMC. On occasion,
even if exercises have been designed to provide useful
information about SMC, an instructor may possess other
evidence regarding SMC at least as useful as that provided by
performance on any particular exercise or array of exercises.
Therefore the principle of academic honesty dictates that an
instructor should make every effort within reason to provide
grading exercises that accurately portray a student's SMC.
Grades should be understood to reflect SMC because
transcript readers use them, in general, to assess SMC.
Psychometricians speak of a person's "true score": the score she
would obtain on a perfect test of her ability, skill, or knowledge
of a certain concept or subject area. Someone's performance on
an individual test is thought to reflect closely her actual
subject-matter competence depending on the test's accuracy.
A student's performance on an individual test is thought to
approximate more or less closely to her true score depending on
the test's accuracy. Her test performance is used, in effect, to
estimate her true score.
(Thus, a "standard error of
measurement" will be calculated for any typical widely-used
standardized examination in order to help anyone interpreting
a score on the examination to estimate how close to the testtaker's true score her actual score is likely to fall.) By analogy,
we may say that a transcript reader hopes that, when she
reviews a student's transcript, she is learning as much as
possible about the student's true grades. She is unlikely to
be-and has no good reason to be-interested in information
about the student's past academic performance for its own
sake; she wants to know what she can expect from the student
in the future. She is unlikely to be concerned about the
vagaries of a student's performance on a particular exercise in
a given course as a whole except as this helps her forecast the
student's future performance. Thus, in turn, the instructor's
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goal should be the determination of a student's true grade.
Performance on a variety of individual exercises can be used to
help the instructor identify the true grade. But what should be
of interest to the instructor is the "true grade" itselr_3 1
This obviously does not mean that grades should be
determined in freewheeling abstraction from academic
performance. There are good reasons for using performance as
a key indicator of a student's true grade and, indeed, for
choosing only rarely to assign a grade in light of anything other
than the student's aggregate performance on all assigned
exercises. 12 In a given instance, evidence regarding a student's
SMC is available apart from her aggregate class performance.
Other bases for judgments regarding SMC may be available
but there may be good reason to be uncertain of their reliability
or accuracy.
Taking factors other than aggregate class
performance into account, especially in an individual case, may
require an inefficient use of an instructor's time. Perhaps most
importantly, fairness-like the need to ensure that grades are
useful to transcript readers-requires that each comparable
grade reflect a judgment regarding competence, understood in
a consistent way, with respect to the same subject matter.
Diversifying the ways in which instructors determine grades

31. Thus, given the PAE, it is not helpful to say that a grade "represents a value
judgment concerning the relative quality of a student's achievement of course objectives
during a specified period of instruction," Terwilliger, supra n. 21, at 22 (emphasis
added), or that it "is intended to represent an expert's judgment of the quality of a
student's work within a specified area of inquiry, Cahn, supra n. 22, at 25 (emphasis
added). A student's grade ought not to be a reflection simply or primarily of her
"achievement" or "work" per se, but with this achievement or work as an estimator of
SMC. Cahn concedes as much when he says that "[s]tudents who receive C's in
introductory physics are not C persons with C personalities or C moral characters, but
individuals who have achieved only a fair grasp of the fundamentals of elementary
physics," supra n. 22, at 26 (emphasis added). Similarly, he notes that the fact that a
student received an F in a course means that she "failed to master any significant part
of it" and that "[a] person who requires two, three[,] or four attempts to pass calculus
lacks the mathematical or study skills of someone who passes the first time .... " ld. at
27 (emphasis added). He suggests that the instructor who "grades on a curve" has
confused "rank in class ... with mastery of subject matter." !d. at 29 (emphasis added).
,John S. Brubacher, On the Philosophy of Higher Education 108 (Jossey-Bass
Publishers 1982) may elide the two distinct ideas when he argues that "grades should
be regarded not merely as motivators but as genuine measures of achievement in the
mastery of the higher learning." It is also possible to read Brubacher as focusing
primarily on mastery-so that "achievement in the mastery of higher learning" means
something like SMC.
:32. I will subsequently use the expression aggregate class performance for this
sort of performance.
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runs the risk of multiplying the meanings of grades in
particular courses. Further, consistent academic standards
make it easier for an instructor to avoid being swayed by biases
that have nothing to do with a student's academic capacities,
and such standards are easiest to apply to students'
performance on ordinary course assignments. So there are
good reasons to focus on aggregate class performance when
determining grades.
That grades ought to reflect SMC is, as I have emphasized,
no reason to ignore aggregate class performance.
It is,
however, a reason for an instructor to base grades only on
student performance on exercises likely to lead to an accurate
measure of students' true grades. It is also a reason for her to
be open to evidence that might lead her to assign a student a
grade different from the one she might assign if she attended
only to aggregate class performance. This is so at any rate,
presuming-and
only presuming-that this evidence is
genuinely reliable and likely to foster accuracy, that she can
publicly justify her use of this evidence if she is willing to take
comparable evidence into account when determining other
students' grades if it is available.
Ordinarily, the instructor is entitled to assume that the
same evaluative methods are appropriate for all students, but
this is only a presumption. Suppose she has a particular
reason to believe that she can more accurately estimate a
student's SMC using a technique other than the one she
employs to estimate the grades of other students.
In
accordance with the PAE, she should use the more accurate
approach, provided she can clearly document her reasons for
employing it. Fairness dictates that she treats like cases alike
and different cases differently. If she can demonstrate that a
particular student's case is relevantly different from the cases
of other students, it may be acceptable, and perhaps even
obligatory, for her to assess this student differently in order to
ensure that the student's grade is an accurate estimate of her
SMC.
SMC is not the bare ability to recall facts or em~loy ~ertain
intellectual tools. An instructor may reasonably 1den~1fy the
ability to make use of relevant skills, informatiOn, or
understanding in a particular setting as ~n eleme~t of SMC.
Thus, while it may sometimes be appropnate to d1scount the
effects of intense situational pressure on a student, accurately
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assessing SMC may sometimes require that a student's
capacity to function under pressure be taken into account; in
an exceptional case, performance under pressure may well be
one of the skills that make up SMC.
Students are relatively similar, and evidence suggesting
that conventional evaluative exercises are inaccurate
estimators of SMC will not often be available. Provided that
appropriate exercises are assigned, aggregate course
performance can be a good, though certainly not a perfect,
indicator of a student's SMC.

II. ACADEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM AND RETRIBUTIVISM
A variety of conventional academic practices appear
inconsistent with the principle of academic exclusivity (PAE).
These practices are almost always defended using one of two
possible theoretical approaches: academic consequentialism
and academic retributivism. Here this paper will explore
particular issues in the ethics of grading and will address
specific arguments that proponents of each of these positions
might offer. However, before turning to specifics, some more
general observations about these approaches should be made
as to why, neither approach is arguably plausible.
A. Academic Consequentialism
Consequentialism is the thesis that the moral rightness or
wrongness of an act is a function of the state of affairs it brings
into being-of its consequences. Academic consequentialism is
the application of consequentialism to grading.
Someone
committed to general academic consequentialism will make
grading decisions with the purpose of bringing about the
greatest possible amount of good in the universe, whereas,
someone committed to restricted academic consequentialism
will make grading decisions with the purpose of bringing about
the greatest possible amount of some more narrowly specified
good.
The academic consequentialist will be inclined to
understand a grade in instrumental terms.
She will
understand it as a means of motivating transcript readers of
various sorts to view a student with favor or disfavor.
Furthermore, because the possible reactions of transcript
readers to a grade can affect the student's welfare, grading
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criteria will also serve as a means of motivating the student.
The instructor's authority to assign grades gives her
considerable leverage over a student's behavior, and if applying
a consequentialist view, she will use this authority. Whenever
it is likely to prove effective, a consequentialist instructor may
use the threat of a bad grade or the promise of a good one to
prompt a student to behave in ways that maximize the good.
Similarly, she will use her ability to motivate transcript
readers by means of the grades she assigns to respond
favorably to students with the goal of maximizing the good.
To begin with general academic consequentialism: suppose
a student from a wealthy family is experiencing academic
difficulties at a secondary school or university. Aware that a
positive report from the student may lead the student's mother
to be exceptionally generous when approached by university
development personnel, a consequentialist instructor might
conclude under some circumstances, assuming the institution
serves the general good, it would make sense to use a grade as
a means of increasing the student's satisfaction with the
institution and the consequent likelihood of a substantial gift
from the student's mother. 33
It is not certain, of course what this instructor should do on
consequentialist grounds. The circumstances may lead him to
believe that, on the balance, assigning an inaccurate grade to
this student would be counter-productive. The consequentialist
is not usually committed to grading inaccurately. There is no
consequentialist reason why, in general, he shouldn't at least
consider the possible impact of a grade on her institution's
bottom line.
This is, of course, just the sort of counter-intuitive example
regularly canvassed in the literature on consequentialism.:34 It
will strike some readers as extreme; it is presented here with
the suspicion that most instructors will be disinclined to
approve of using grades to increase donations. However, the
33. Alternatively, suppose that an instructor wishes to benefit a socioeconomically
disadvantaged student. A good grade will help the student obtain educational and
professional opportunities that will increase her socioeconomic status.
34. For a classic challenge of this sort, see H. J. McCloskey, A Note on Utilitarian
Punishment, 72 Mind 599 (1963) (a utilitarian sheriff might deliberately execute an
innocent person to prevent a riot that might lead to bloodshed). For a genial utilitarian
response, see J. J. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J. J. C. Smart
& Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against 1, 69-72 (Cambridge U. Press
1973).
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sections that follow suggest that rejecting academic
consequentialism has implications for a variety of common
academic practices.
There are good reasons for rejecting consequentialism
generally.
Perhaps most fundamentally, consequentialism
depends on the assumption that it is possible, in some
meaningful way, to aggregate goods or preferences to permit
the global comparison of states of affairs. But if particular
human goods and particular instances of human goods are
incommensurable, so that this kind of aggregation is
impossible, consequentialism can't get off the ground.
Consequentialism can also be criticized because it seems to be
blind to distributional issues many of us think are morally
significant; because it seems unable to take adequate account
of special responsibilities and special relationships like
friendship; it instrumentalizes relationships, projects, and
values we tend to think of as intrinsically valuable; and
because it gives a poor account of promise-keeping and truthtelling.35
The rejection of a consequentialist rationale for grading will
often be motivated by the intuition that assigning grades as a
means of enhancing the general welfare flies in the face of the
commitment to the truth that is central to academic life.
Truth-telling is central to and definitive of the practices of
teaching, learning, and scholarship. Even those who do not
believe that consequentialism is a non-starter as a moral
theory may still be skeptical about the use of a general
consequentialist rationale for assigning grades. 36
35. For criticisms of consequentialist approaches, see Alasdair C. Macintyre,
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 61-63, 67-68, 185 (2d ed., U. of Notre Dame
Press 1984); Finnis, supra n. 30, at 111-119; John M. Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics
80-108 (Oxford U. Press 1983); John M. Finnis, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. & Germain G.
Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism 177-296 (Oxford U. Press 1987);
Germain G. Grisez & Russell Shaw, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of
Freedom (3rd. ed., U. of Notre Dame Press 1988); Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education 86-87, 151-154 (3d ed., U. of Notre Dame
Press 1984); Bernard A. 0. Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Harper &
Row 1993); Bernard A. 0. Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in Smart & Williams,
supra n. 32, at 77-150; Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford U.
Press 2000); and Robert Merrihew Adams, Saints, in The Virtue of Faith and Other
Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford U. Press 1988)
36. A defender of consequentialism might point out that widespread assignment
of grades for reasons unrelated to SMC would diminish their usefulness. A
consequentialist grader would obviously have good reason to follow a broad
consequentialist rationale for grading sparingly. However, this clearly wouldn't give
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The inappropriateness of academic consequentialism is
apparent even when the academic consequentialist seeks to
37
maximize something other than the general welfare. The most
obvious sort of restricted academic consequentialism urges the
assignment of grades as a means to motivate student learning.
The instructor might seek to benefit a student by giving her a
grade that suggests that she has more SMC than she actually
does in order to improve her confidence and encourage her to
remain in school and continue learning. The instructor might
seek to benefit a student by giving her a grade that suggests
that she has less SMC than she actually does in order to
encourage her to avoid what the instructor believes is
irresponsible academic conduct that may limit her learning in
other contexts. The instructor might seek to benefit a group of
which the student is a member by giving her a grade that
suggests that she has less SMC than she actually does in order
to maintain confidence in a system of grading norms the
instructor believes will motivate students to learn effectively.
In all of these above cases, the instructor's goals are
academic in nature. She seeks to promote effective learning.
However, like general academic consequentialism, restricted
academic consequentialism is indefensible. It requires the
same impossible commensuration of consequences on which
consequentialism in general depends.
The range of
consequences the restricted academic consequentialist is
prepared to consider is narrower than those the general
academic consequentialist is prepared to consider.
But this
does not change the fact that the academic and nonacademic
factors at issue in decisions about academic evaluation cannot
be objectively measured on a common scale. And like general
academic
consequentialism,
restricted
academic
consequentialism counter-intuitively violates the principle of

the would-be-consequentialist grader a reason not to give a grade for welfaremaximizing reasons in any given case. And the consequentialist's willingness to offer
this observation might perhaps be seen as respect for the independent worth of
intuitions for which, on consequentialist grounds, she need have no regard, and thus as
a concession of consequentialism's inadequacy. If it is a defense of consequentialism to
show that it yields results consistent with certain non-consequentialist intuitions, the
implication seems to be that if it did not do so it might be worth revising or
abandoning.
37. Again, I want to emphasize that intending to maximize the general welfare is
like intending to draw a square circle: it's not doable even in principle. But it is surely
possible to intend to do something impossible.
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truth-telling.
Restricted academic consequentialism is
designed to foster learning and the discovery of truth.
Ironically and self-defeatingly, consequentialism leads
instructors to deny the truth as a means of promoting the
acquisition and dissemination of truth.
There seems to be little reason why an authentic
consequentialist would choose on a consistent basis to be a
restricted academic consequentialist. Similarly, there is little
reason for someone not inclined to consequentialism in the first
place to regard it as appropriate in an academic environment
alone.
A conventional consequentialist will make
conduciveness to the general welfare the ultimate criteria for
her actions (she won't necessarily appeal to this criterion when
making individual decisions, of course). She will wish to take
all consequences into account (directly or indirectly), and
someone with principled objections to consequentialism in
general won't be able to defend consequentialism as a
normative defense for a particular approach to academic
evaluation. An intuitionist moralist might not face a charge of
personal inconsistency if she argued for the appropriateness of
consequentialist reasoning under some circumstances and of
other kinds of moral reasoning under others. 38 However, she
will still need to confront the general positive objections to
consequentialism. Others will be forced to choose between
adopting
general
academic
consequentialism
(and
consequentialism more generally) with predictable but
implausible
and
undesirable
results,
or
rejecting
consequentialisms of all sorts in favor of more satisfactory
approaches to moral reasoning about, among other things,
academic life.

B. Academic Retributiuism
Retributivism is the view that the criminal justice system,
among others, should allocate benefits and harms to people in
light of what they purportedly deserve. Academic retributiuism
is the concept that a grade may in part rightly reflect a moral
judgment regarding a student's character as it manifests itself

38. The sort of intuitionism I have in mind is the sort best represented by W.D.
Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford U. Press 1930); and W. David Ross, Foundations
of Ethics: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Aberdeen, 1935-1936
(Oxford U. Press 1939); see generally Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (B1ackwell1993).
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in academic contexts. Under academic retributivism, a grade
may be in part a means of rewarding a student for morally
good academic conduct and punishing her for morally bad
academic conduct.
Academic retributivism is objectionable on several counts.
Again, it leads to results inconsistent with the principle of
academic incommensurability and the principle of truth-telling.
I will explore the ways in which it does so in greater detail
later in this paper. I want to point out here at a more general
level that academic retributivism can be rejected on the same
basis as retributivism in general.
A basic flaw in all forms of retributivism is that they
transplant ways of reasoning that seem appropriate in the
economic sphere into the non-economic sectors of our lives. If I
unjustly cause you to lose something that is purely
instrumental in value, purely monetary in worth, then I can
compensate you for this loss by providing you with a
replacement or substitute or simply by giving you the monetary
equivalent of what I have caused you to lose. What matters is
not that I have lost something in the process but that you have
been made whole.
Retributivism transfers the logic of economic exchange into
an arena in which it makes no sense. We speak of retribution
as a matter of "paying back" someone who has done something
harmful. But this is a case of metaphorical language doing
work that ought to be done by careful philosophical argument.
The idea of punishment for moral wrong means causing some
harm to me because I have caused some putatively equivalent
harm to you. But it is easy to see that, once stripped of the
support provided to this idea by out-of-place economic
metaphors, it is fundamentally nonsensical. Suppose I tell lies
about you to our mutual friends and cause you to lose one or
more important close relationships. The logic of retribution
suggests that I should suffer some harm as a result. It is
obvious, however, that any harm I might suffer could itself
restore your relationship with any friend from whom you've
39
become alienated because of my deception. Even if I am
39. Of course, I am obligated to do my best to repair the breach I have caused.
And in the course of doing this I may suffer harms of one sort or another. But the
notion that harms may follow on attempts to redress wrongs is quite different from the
notion that such harms should follow and that their occurrence is or can be a
constitutive part of what redressing them means.
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punished, you are no better off after I've suffered some punitive
harm than you were before. 40 You haven't been paid back at
all.
If you believe or feel that you have, it's because you
misconstrue harm to you as a benefit to me because of the
41
curious logic of retribution.
It should be obvious that, as an instance of retributivism in
general, academic retributivism is indefensible for the same
reason that retributivism in general is indefensible. The
retributive punishment of students who have caused
academically cognizable harms of one sort or another harms
the students but does not itself constitute any sort of real
42
restitution to those they have harmed. Retribution is not a
means of effecting restitution. This is true whether grading is
used as a means of retribution (positive or negative) for moral
conduct
and
character generally (general
academic
retributivism) or only for a narrower range of acts and
character traits perceived to be directly relevant to the life of
the academy (restricted academic retributivism).
General academic retributivism suffers from the
incoherence of retributivism generally.
It also leads to
intuitively implausible consequences. On general retributivist
grounds, it seems as if grades should reflect a range of student
virtues. Perhaps, for instance, a student who saves a drowning
boater on the school's lake might deserve higher grades.
40. Strike & Soltis, supra n. 23, at 29 ("Perhaps the weakest point in the
retribution theory of punishment is the suggestion that the universe somehow requires
that evildoers be punished with a compensating quantity of pain. Why should we
believe this? The point can be put more forcefully. The retribution theory seems to
require that we respond to one evil event by adding a second. How is the universe
improved by adding an additional piece of suffering to it? If we are to punish evildoers,
ought we not to expect some good to result? Otherwise, does not punishment merely
add gratuitously to the pain in the world?").
41. A policy or institution created with retributive rationales may sometimes be
defended on consequentialist grounds. Retribution is seen, for instance, as deterring
subsequent harmful conduct by others, as treating the punished person as an example
to others. If the use of consequentialist arguments involves a repudiation of the
previously-advanced retributivist ones, then we do not need to attend to retributivist
arguments for the policy or institution; those already outlined and subsequently
elaborated against consequentialism will suffice. If, by contrast, the consequentialist
arguments serve primarily to provide a cover for atavistic retributivist impulses, then
the counter to retributivism I have offered here and on which I will expand below will
show the policy or institution to be undesirable.
42. Again, these students may be harmed instrumentally, with the purpose of
bringing about some benefit to others-perhaps the others they have harmed. But in
this case they are being harmed on consequentialist grounds, and the standard
objections to consequentialism will apply.
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Perhaps a student who helps classmates study should be
rewarded by receiving an "A" instead of an "A-", and so on.
General academic retributivism seems highly implausible.
A defender of retributivism may be inclined to suggest that
this paper mischaracterizes what retributivism actually looks
like in practice. For the retributivist, there needs to be some
sort of equivalence between a student's conduct or character
and the way she is treated. She ought to suffer the sort of
harm she has done, experience the kind of good she has
fostered. The rule of equivalence seems to exert a measure of
control over what retributivists might be prepared to argue and
to help them avoid absurd conclusions. But there are two
problems with this response.
First, individual harms and benefits aren't commensurable.
Once we've left the monetary realm, it is impossible to say even
that two instances of a given human good could be exchanged
for each other. Second, we don't ordinarily seek this kind of
equivalence when we practice retributivism-academic, or
otherwise. An equivalence-based rationale makes the most
sense as a defense of execution as a judicial response to
murder, though even here it does not, of course, for the same
reason that retributivism generally doesn't work: the
murderer's loss of life obviously does nothing for the victim or
the victim's survivors. 43 It makes no sense at all in other
contexts, and we don't even act as if it did. We don't lie to the
academically dishonest; we don't see to it that late students are
forced to wait. The punishments educational institutions seek
on retributivist grounds to impose on students who cause
academically cognizable harms aren't in any obvious sense
equivalent to those harms, even if we grant the retributivist's
commensurability assumption.
These practices cannot,
therefore, be plausibly defended on retributivist grounds. In
43. Craig Kinzer has suggested that an objector could argue that the beneficiary
here is the community rather than the victim or her survivors, but it is not clear how
best to make sense of this notion. If the idea is that the community is better off
because a person with a propensity for violence has been eliminated, so that there is no
possibility that she will harm anyone in the future, then the objector seems to be
making a consequentialist argument, subject to the standard criticisms of
consequentialism. (In any case, it is not clear why life imprisonment cannot, in
principle, accomplish the same sort of risk reduction.) By contrast, if the objector
believes that the community simply is better because someone who has caused someone
else to lose something has lost something herself, I confess puzzlement. I do not see
how the criminal's loss can be construed as constituting a gain for the community
absent some doubtful economistic assumptions that seem inappropriate in this context.
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any case, however, whatever the counter-intuitive character of
the conclusions to which academic retributivism might be
thought to lead, the essentially incoherent and misleading
character of academic retributivism makes it an inappropriate
basis for academic decision-making.
Ill. THE P AE AND COMMON ACADEMIC PRACTICES
Consequentialism and retributivism are unattractive
guides to the moral life generally and to the ethics of grading in
particular. They give us no good reason to reject the principle
of academic exclusivity (PAE). Given that the PAE is plausible
on other grounds and that there are good reasons for rejecting
the alternatives the educational community should endorse the
PAE.
The PAE has implications for grading practices in a number
of areas: the use of attendance to determine grades, the role of
homework and busywork in grading, the treatment of academic
dishonesty, policies regarding changes in grades, policies
related to late work, and procedures regarding incomplete
grades. In this section, I explain these implications and defend
the conclusions I draw from the PAE about grading practices.
Though I challenge some common evaluative practices, I do not
wish to deny that the goods they seek to serve are often
valuable. I simply wish to argue that educational institutions
should employ means consistent with the PAE to accomplish
worthwhile nonacademic goals.

A. Attendance and Participation
In light of the PAE, there is little or no reason for an
instructor to take a student's attendance into account when
assigning her a grade. Using participation to help determine a
student's grade can, however, be consistent with the PAE.
That a student attends a lecture is not, in and of itself, a
particularly good reason to believe that she possesses any
particular level of SMC. It may be more likely that a given
student will be more competent with respect to the subject
matter of a class if she attends it than if she does not. But
attendance itself does not demonstrate SMC, and absence does
not show a lack of SMC. A student's presence at a class is not
the kind of performance that could even in principle
demonstrate that she is competent with respect to the subject
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matter of the class. At best, it can demonstrate a degree of
exposure to the subject matter that might provide limited
support for the contention that she has SMC. Whether she
does or not can be assessed in a variety of ways other than
noting her attendance or absence. Either an instructor has
reason to believe the evaluative instruments she uses to assess
her students' SMC are reasonably accurate or she does not. If
the instructor believes grades are an accurate reflection of
SMC then it is difficult to see how she could reasonably believe
that altering grades based on sheer attendance would improve
her ability to estimate her students' SMC. If she believes they
are not, then she ought to replace them. She should not rely on
attendance-based measures to improve the accuracy of her
grades. Increasing or decreasing a student's grade because of
her attendance record means implying, inaccurately, that she
possesses a degree of SMC for which her attendance provides
no evidence. It violates her duty to avoid deception.
An instructor is generally unlikely to take attendance into
account when determining grades simply or primarily because
she thinks attendance is an especially good indicator of SMC.
She may have some other rationale.
(1) She may believe that attendance reflects habits and
character traits likely to be of interest to transcript readers,
and she may suppose her student's grades should communicate
these habits and traits.
(2) She may seek to offer students an incentive to develop
these habits and traits; she may wish to offer students an
incentive to attend because she believes attendance is crucial to
learning.
(3) She may wish to punish students for what she believes
is a morally irresponsible choice not to learn and develop habits
of punctuality and attendance at scheduled appointments.
(4) She may believe that a student who fails to attend her
classes will waste her time and that of others both by asking
questions in or outside class that would have been answer~d
had the student attended class. She may believe that they w1ll
waste her time by submitting examinations or out-of-class
assignments which she will be forced to grade even th~u~h the
displayed level of SMC is too low for the work to be m1~nmally
satisfactory. She may also believe that those who arnve late
will waste her time and the time of other. students by
disrupting her classes when they arrive. She m1ght thus seek
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to use her grading scheme to discourage students from being
late or absent.
All of these objectives except the third are appropriate, but
none is appropriately achieved using grades. None justifies
violating the PAE by allowing a student's attendance to affect
her grade.
(1) To repeat, a grade should not be best thought of as
reflecting a variety of nonacademic character traits. Transcript
readers have no way of knowing whether or not a grade might
have been affected by these traits. Because nonacademic
character traits are so different from the SMC a grade is
intended primarily to measure, it is meaningless to combine
character traits with SMC in determining a student's grade.
(2) Attendance is surely useful for students. The desire for
a good grade or the fear of a bad one may prompt a student to
attend class. And offering credit of one kind or another for
attendance will obviously not have the sort of affect on student
behavior an instructor is likely to desire unless she fulfills her
attendance-related promises or threats. If she intends to use
her grading scheme as an attendance motivator, she must, in
accordance with that scheme, give students who attend higher
grades than they would have otherwise received in light of the
available measures of their SMC and, conversely, give students
who are late, or who fail to attend, lower grades. This sort of
practice demands an academic consequentialist justification.
But academic consequentialism in general is unwarranted.
Further, in assigning grades for consequentialist reasons, an
instructor clearly violates the PAE. She fails to tell the truth
about her students' SMC. Some students may receive poor
grades because of their poor attendance. They may suffer later
because they have acquired poor habits. But the goal of
preventing these harms does not justify violating the PAE.
(3) Poor attendance may sometimes be a moral wrong, but
so is assigning grades based on attendance. Doing so depends
on the incoherent idea of retribution and involves
misrepresenting students' SMC. Thus, it violates the PAE.
(4) An instructor may be warranted in the belief that late
or absent students will waste her time or the time of other
students, and that she can use the threat of poor grades to
deter such waste. But again, consequentialist arguments of
this sort are unconvincing both because consequentialism is a
non-starter and because truth-telling underlies the PAE. In
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any case, the instructor has other means of preventing time
from being wasted. For instance, it would be consistent with
the P AE for an instructor to require that a student drop a class
if, whether because of perpetual absence or for some other
reason, the student took up an excessive amount of her time
and showed no promise of gaining satisfactory competence with
respect to the subject matter of the class before the end of the
term during which the class was taking place. The PAE would
require only that the student's transcript reflect the fact that
she was forcibly dropped from the class and that it make clear
that any grade recorded is an estimate made at the time she
dropped rather than a grade determined on the basis of a
term's worth of assignments.
Unlike attendance, a student's participation in class
discussions can provide an instructor with useful information
regarding a student's SMC. It is thus quite consistent with the
PAE for an instructor to take into account what a student says
during class discussions and how she says it in determining the
student's grade, provided she focuses on what the student's
participation reveals about her SMC. 44 It would not, by
contrast, be appropriate for an instructor to reward a student
just because she participated. The instructor should not give
the student credit for participation without attending to what
she says and how she says it as indices of SMC. If she does,
she runs the risk of effectively rewarding a student for
attendance alone-or perhaps for exhibiting the virtuous habit
of helping others learn-and thus is guilty of violating the
PAE.

B. Reading and Writing Assignments
The PAE rules out assigning grades on the basis of
"busywork." It precludes taking into account the simple fact
44. An instructor may believe-plausibly-that participation plays a vital role in
facilitating the learning of others. She may also believe-plausibly-that a student is
likely to read and think more carefully than she otherwise might when preparing for a
class in which participation is required and that her subject-matter competence will
consequently be enhanced. She may thus welcome a variety of positive consequences
affected by a decision to award credit for participation, and the PAE gives her no
reason not to do so. It merely stipulates that the potential value of these consequences
gives her no independent justification for taking participation into account when she
determines her students' grades and no basis for evaluating student participation, if
she requires it, in a way that fails to focus on its value as a means of estimating
students' likely subject-matter competence.
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that a student has or has not read a body of assigned material
at a particular time. More controversially, it discourages
instructors from basing grades on a student's performance on
homework exercises designed to help the student build skills.
According to the PAE, a student's performance on an
assignment should contribute to the determination ofher grade
to the extent that it helps her instructor estimate her SMC. An
assignment which allows more precise estimation of a
particular aspect of a student's SMC should be preferred to one
which allows less.
Given the PAE, it would never be
appropriate to give credit to a student simply for reading an
assigned text, as opposed to completing a review that shows
critical engagement with the text. The purpose of offering
credit simply for reading a text would be roughly the same as
the purpose of offering credit for attendance and being prompt
or for rewarding good behavior and discouraging or punishing
bad behavior. Evidence that a student has read a text is
evidence that she has been exposed to certain material, not that
she has understood it or engaged with it critically. In most
cases, evidence that she has not read a text is only presumptive
evidence that she has not been exposed to the relevant material
as she could have been exposed to it in some other way. 45 In any
case, an instructor's evaluative exercises give her a much more
accurate means of assessing a student's SMC than simple
knowledge that a student has read a portion of an assigned
text.
There is no hard-and-fast distinction between practiceoriented, skill-building homework exercises and others, which
serve primarily to facilitate the accurate assessment of SMC,
such as in-class examinations. However, it is clear that some
homework exercises are designed primarily to help students
acquire proficiencies of various sorts instead of measuring
SMC. Homework exercises in mathematics classes are obvious
examples; a student practices problems of a certain type to
learn how to approach an indefinite variety of possible future
problems of the same sort. Whether she has in fact learned to
do so will be estimated using examinations that measure her
abilities under monitored and time-controlled conditions.
45. Obviously, in a course in literature a student usually cannot be exposed to all
of the relevant material except by reading the assigned text; digesting Cliffs Notes will
tell a student something useful about Huckleberry Finn, but the student won't discover
the delights of Twain's language or engage directly with his literary artistry.
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In accordance with the PAE, an instructor should where
possible, avoid basing grades on students' performance on
repetitive, skill-building exercises CRSEs). Instructors should
assign such exercises where appropriate, but they may violate
the PAE when used to estimate students' SMC and in
determining their grades.
In most cases, a student's
performance on examinations, papers, and projects will provide
a much better basis for estimating her SMC. Information
gained from students' performance on RSEs will often be, at
best, superfluous. Consider four possibilities: (1) a student
does well on examinations, papers, and projects and on RSEs;
(2) the student does well on RSEs and poorly on examinations,
papers, and projects; (3) the student does poorly on RSEs (or
does not complete them at all) and well on examinations,
papers, and projects; (4) the student does poorly on RSEs and
on examinations, papers, and projects.
In cases (1) and (4), the RSEs provide the instructor with no
useful information as she determines the student's grade. In
case (2), the instructor has some reason to suspect that the
student is cheating, receiving help, or taking an inordinate
amount of time to complete the RSEs. It is also possible, of
course, that the student is a poor test-taker but is developing
genuine SMC, which is revealed by her performance on the
RSEs. If the instructor believes that this is the case, she
cannot do so on the basis of the RSEs, the interpretation of
which is in question. And she cannot do so on the basis of the
student's overall examination performance, which is, ex
hypothesi, poor. If, nonetheless, she is warranted in believing
that the student is acquiring more SMC than the student's
examination performance suggests, the PAE suggests that this
belief might appropriately be reflected in the grade she assigns
the student. However, in this case, the determinative fact
would be that she has independent reason to believe the RSEs
reflect the student's true SMC more accurately than do
examinations instead of making a general decision to base
grades in whole, or in part, on RSE performance.
In case (3), the instructor has little or no reason to base the
student's grade on her RSE performance, provided the
instructor is confident that her examinations, papers, and
projects enable her to accurately estimate the student's true
grade. If they do, the student's RSE scores are superfluous and
reducing the student's grade because of her RSE performance
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will violate the PAE, given that the grade will be a less
accurate estimate of her SMC than if her RSE scores are
excluded.
It is possible, of course, that the instructor reasonably
believes that her examinations alone do not allow her to
accurately estimate a student's SMC and that it is not
practicable for her to design them in such a way that they do.
If she reasonably believes this, and if she also reasonably
believes that combining RSE performance with examination
performance allows her to estimate the student's grade more
accurately than would considering examination performance
alone, she does not violate the P AE by taking RSE performance
into account. It is unclear, however, what would provide
evidence that taking RSEs into account when determining
grades yields a more accurate estimate of SMC than not
considering them. 46 And it is crucial to ensure that, in the rare
cases in which RSEs are rightly taken into account, grades are
not influenced by such irrelevancies as a capable student's lack
of interest in completing busywork. Even if an instructor takes
RSEs into account when determining some students' grades,
she need not do so when determining any given student's grade
unless doing so increases the likelihood that she will accurately
estimate the student's SMC. 47
Of course, instructors may tend to give students credit for
their RSE performance not because they believe that RSE
performance is a good estimator of students' true grades but
because they believe that by doing so they will encourage
students to complete RSEs and thus to master relevant skills.
But this sort of academic consequentialist reasoning falls foul

46. Where there is a significant disparity between a student's performance on a
comprehensive final examination and her performance on prior examinations during a
course, a similar problem may arise; if so, a similar analysis would apply in accordance
with the PAE. If the final examination yields an estimate of a student's subject-matter
competence that is clearly more accurate than one based on consideration of all
examinations, the instructor should focus on the final examination when determining
the student's grade. But there is a stronger case to be made for the view that
performance on prior examinations is a useful contributor to an overall assessment of a
student's subject matter competence than there is for the view that RSE performance
should play this role. And, indeed, there is a reason to believe that single examination
is a less accurate estimator of students' subject matter competence than an array of
exilminations or other exercises.
4 7. Educational institutions rightly care about students' self-discipline, but
students' character development is best encouraged in ways that do not affect their
grades. But see the discussion oflate and missed work, infra.
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of the standard criticisms of academic consequentialism and
will, in some cases, lead an instructor to violate the PAE. An
instructor violates the PAE if, on the basis of a student's RSE
performance, she gives a lower grade to the student than her
examination performance suggests she should receive, not
because the examination performance is an inaccurate
estimator of the student's SMC, but because the instructor
wishes to maintain a system of incentives for other students to
build skills by completing RSEs or for the student to develop
better study habits.
The PAE requires a preference for examinations and
essays, rather than RSEs, as means of estimating students'
SMC and determining grades. In accordance with the PAE,
quizzes may also be taken into account in determining grades
to the extent that they can serve as accurate snapshots of
student performance rather than as motivational tools
designed to spur students to prepare for class discussions or
attend class.
An instructor may welcome the positive
motivational impact of the practice of administering regular
quizzes, but this practice must be justified on other groundsotherwise, it will, in reality, be serving inappropriate
consequentialist or retributivist purposes.
C. Service-Learning

Engaging in service activities can be a valuable way of
learning about social problems and developing habits of
compassion and generosity. It is perfectly reasonable that
service activities might be among the learning experiences
associated with a given course. However, the PAE dictates
that students be graded in light of their SMC, not their
participation in these activities.
The usual sorts of inappropriate reasons may be given for
awarding credit for service-learning. Consequentialists will
wish to encourage participation in service ventures and the
development of useful habits.
Retributivists will wish to
reward the virtuous who participate and punish the selfish who
do not. Based on the arguments already presented, these
reasons are facially unpersuasive.
Participation in a service activity connected with a given
course may foster the development of competence with respect
to the subject matter of the course, presuming the activity has
been selected with an eye to fostering class-specific learning
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rather than simply encouraging the development of the more
general habits of compassion and generosity. But even if an
activity has been selected to help students develop SMC,
evaluative instruments should be employed to determine
whether students have actually acquired greater SMC as a
result of participating in it. It cannot be assumed that they
have acquired greater SMC simply because they have
participated in service-learning activities, and it cannot be
assumed that they have not acquired greater SMC because
they have not participated. Ordinary evaluative instruments
are likely to be far more effective at estimating students' SMC
than the mere participation in service-learning activities.
Service-learning, as currently understood, characteristically
includes a reflective component. Students are asked to explore
the meaning of the service activities in which they have
engaged and to explain what the activities might have taught
them. Provided such reflective exercises are taken seriously
and evaluated as possible estimators of SMC, instructors may
reasonably consider them when determining grades. It will be
important, however, not to give them undue weight or to
evaluate them using standards different from those employed
with respect to other evaluative instruments. Otherwise, it
will be difficult to escape the conclusion that students are being
rewarded simply for participating in service activities or
punished for not participating, thus violating the PAE.
To be sure, it is conceivable that some kinds of learning can
happen only through doing. It may not be possible for a
student to acquire some kinds of habits and attitudes without
participating in service-learning activities.
But habits of
compassion and generosity are quite different from SMC; this
incommensurability
makes
combining
service-learning
activities with measures of SMC to determine grades a dubious
enterprise. Further, grades, as conventionally understood, do
not measure or reflect habits of this sort, so taking the
development or exhibition of such characteristics into account
violates the PAE's truth-telling requirement.
Grades are
concerned with more narrowly cognitive capacities.
It is
reasonable for institutions and instructors to assess students'
affective and moral development but this assessment should be
distinguished from grading.
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D. Late Work

In accordance with the PAE, a student's grade should not
be reduced because the work that is the basis for her grade is
late. The PAE licenses limited exceptions to this norm based
on the need to avoid substantial inconvenience and to ensure
the usefulness of evaluative instruments.
The PAE-based argument against grade reductions for
lateness is simple and straightforward. A grade is a rough
measure of a student's SMC. The purpose of evaluative
instruments is to help the instructor estimate a student's SMC.
The time at which a student submits an exercise often provides
minimal evidence regarding her SMC. A paper on Milton
submitted on Thursday can provide the same sort of useful
information about the student's competence as a paper
submitted on the previous Monday. To reduce the grade for the
paper submitted on Thursday because it is late would increase
the probability of an inaccurate assessment of the author's
SMC. It would therefore violate the PAE.
Some potential justifications for lateness discounts are
similar to those offered for grade reductions based on
attendance.
Such justifications are subject to the same
rebuttals and will be similarly unsuccessful. Given both the
implausibility of academic consequentialism and retributivism
and the positive requirements of the PAE, academic
consequentialist and retributivist arguments for lateness
discounts fail. Encouraging student responsibility or punishing
student irresponsibility does not warrant inaccurate grading.
However, accurate grading should not become a
monomaniacal passion for any instructor. There are other
things besides grading that rightly claim the instructor's time
and attention. She is not obligated to subject herself to
substantial inconvenience because her students have behaved
irresponsibly. She has the right to delay her assignment of
grades for students who have submitted exercises after she has
requested that these exercises be submitted. If grading an
exercise would create a substantial inconvenience for her but
the student wishes that the grade be submitted at the same
time that she assigns all other grades, the instructor has the
right, under the P AE, to grade the exercise more cursorily than
she would have graded it had it arrived on time. She may act
in these, and perhaps other, ways to reduce unreasonable
inconvenience created by a student's late submission of
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exercises. What she may not do, at least ordinarily, is reduce
the grade on a paper she has, in fact, taken the time to grade
carefully simply because the paper is late. If an inaccuracy in a
student's grade results from a cursory review of an exercise
because the exercise was late, this inaccuracy may simply be
an unintended byproduct of the instructor's reasonable desire
to avoid excessive inconvenience. By contrast, a lateness-based
reduction in a grade for an exercise an instructor has chosen to
inconvenience herself by evaluating with reasonable care iseven if it is also something else-an intentional act of
deception, and thus a violation of the PAE.
The PAE would permit an instructor to accept a late
exercise from a student while discounting the student's
performance on the exercise when determining the student's
final grade. In light of the PAE, it would be appropriate for an
instructor to do so if she reasonably believed that the student's
access to time and information not possessed by others
completing the exercise reduced the value of the student's
performance as a predictor of her SMC. The PAE would also
permit an instructor to simply decline to accept late work in
some cases. Suppose, for instance, that an examination has
been distributed to, and completed by, most students in a class.
If the instructor reasonably believes that a student who was
absent at the time the examination was administered has had
opportunity to confer with others who have taken the
examination and may well have done so, it would be
permissible under the P AE for her to decline to administer the
examination to the student. If the student possessed advance
knowledge of the examination's contents then her performance
on the examination could not be used accurately to predict her
SMC. In such a case, the instructor might prepare an alternate
examination. If constructing such an alternate examination
proves a source of significant inconvenience, the PAE requires
that she attempt to estimate the student's course grade based
on the other resources available to her. Whether she should
assume that the student possesses some competence with
respect to the subject matter that is the focus of the missed
examination, or whether she should treat the student as
having no competence with respect to this subject matter,
depends on the other information available to her about the
student's SMC.
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E. Incomplete Conversions and Other Grade Changes
When faced with a request that she change one
conventional letter grade to another or substitute a
conventional letter grade for an "incomplete" ("I"), an instructor
must consider the probable degree of the inaccuracy, the likely
cost to the student, and the cost to possible transcript readers if
the grade remains unchanged, as well as the inconvenience to
herself. In accordance with the PAE, she may rightly refuse to
change or convert a grade if doing so serves the interests of
accuracy or convenience. However, the PAE precludes any
institutional policy that, for punitive or motivational reasons,
places any limit on an instructor's freedom to change a
student's grade after she has submitted it or which requires
that an incomplete grade become a failing grade ("E" or "F")
after a specified deadline.
Given the invalidity of retributivist and consequentialist
rationales for grade assignment, an instructor should never
change a grade except in the interests of accuracy. Of course,
the passage of time, often a key issue in disputes related to
grade changes and conversions, may create accuracy problems
for instructors because it may limit cross-student comparability
of grades.
Changing or converting a student's grade based upon her
performance on assignments completed after the end of the
term during which she took the course will usually mean that
the student has had more time to complete coursework than
her classmates. In some classes this additional time may be
irrelevant. In others, however, it may affect the accuracy of a
grade. Grades within a given course should be comparable; a
grade earned by one student should have the same meaning as
the same grade earned by another student. The pressure to
complete a project in a limited time, for instance, may have
been a feature of the evaluative process for the course. If this
is so, and if there is no other way to ensure cross-student
comparability, it may be necessary for the instructor to
discount work submitted after she has assigned grades, even
though she rightly takes such work into account. Grades are
certainly more useful to transcript readers if they can facilitate
comparative judgments among students.
An instructor may not remember correctly what standards
she has employed to assess work submitted by other students.
She may thus reasonably lack confidence that she can assess a
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newly submitted assignment for a given course using the same
standards she used initially to determine grades for the course.
Thus, she may reasonably be uncertain that a changed or
converted grade in a given course will have the same meaning
as an identical grade assigned at the end of the term during
which the course took place. If she is uncertain, she may
reasonably decline to consider the newly submitted work.
Alternatively, she may opt to discount the late work in some
way to allow for any recall-related problems.
Like the need for accuracy, the desire for convenience may
rightly justify an instructor's refusal to effect a grade change or
conversion. An instructor is certainly entitled to avoid keeping
student-related records indefinitely (unless the records are the
focus of a legal or institutional controversy of which she has
reason to be aware). Concern for her convenience dictates that
institutional policies permit her to dispose of records related to
a student's performance in a given course after a finite-and
reasonably short-period. If she is asked about a possible
grade change after this period and no longer has the necessary
records, she may not be in a position to evaluate a student's
request for a grade change or conversion. Similarly, if she
reasonably believes the request is frivolous, she is justified in
declining it.
By contrast, the PAE requires that the instructor reevaluate the student's grade if it is reasonable for her to believe
that the student's request for a grade change or conversion has
merit, if she can evaluate the records accurately, and if she can
do so without significant inconvenience. Institutional policy
should permit her to make a grade change or conversion at any
time in the interests of accuracy, though it should not require
her to disregard her reasonable concern for her own
convenience.
The PAE rules out institutional policies that place time
limits on grade changes and those that stipulate that grades
may be changed only to correct clerical errors. To be sure,
there is doubtless a presumption in favor of stable grades.
There is thus a reason for keeping changes unilaterally
initiated by instructors to a minimum.
In addition, an
institutional policy limiting grade changes or conversions
protects instructors, reducing pressure on them to consider
excessively demanding or unreasonable student requests.
Nonetheless, the PAE requires policies that encourage
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accuracy.
Fairness to transcript readers means providing them with
updated, accurate information whenever convenient. Even if a
grade change leads to a reduced grade, a student's expectation
interest in retaining a grade after it has been assigned does not
trump a transcript reader's interest in accurate information
regarding the student's SMC.
The presumption against
instructor-initiated grade changes weighs against such changes
when they reflect, for instance, ongoing uncertainty-dithering,
perhaps-on an instructor's part regarding how best to
estimate a student's SMC. The presumption does not weigh
against a change designed to ensure that a student's grade
more accurately reflects her SMC, provided there is significant
reason to be confident that the new grade is more accurate.
A rigid institutional policy that prevents an instructor from
changing a grade after the passage of an arbitrary deadline
does protect instructors from harassment by students.
Nonetheless, such a policy deprives the instructor of the
freedom to improve the accuracy of her grades. The cost of
additional student harassment does not justify taking this
freedom away from an educator because students and
transcript readers both have substantial interests in accurate
transcripts. The PAE calls for a concern with accuracy that is
not trumped by the institutional need for closure or instructor
convenience. And an instructor who is confident in the grades
she has given can convey this confidence to students as clearly
and forcefully as she can describe a rigid institutional policy,
and so forestall inappropriate demands for grade changes.
Some institutional policies prevent instructors from
changing grades at all except in response to clerical errors.
Such policies may unnecessarily limit the accuracy of grades,
and therefore violate the PAE. A student's grade should reflect
the instructor's best estimate of the student's SMC. There are
a variety of ways of assessing SMC. In an individual case an
instructor may have access to new information that she did not
have when she computed a student's grade that leads her to
reassess the student's SMC. She may also find herself forced to
reassess the procedures she has chosen to use in evaluating the
student's SMC. In either case, she should be free to change a
grade.
Information of at least two kinds might lead an instructor
to reassess a student's SMC. The student might submit
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additional work-work that should have been submitted earlier
or work that supplements the work the student performed
during the term in which she earned the grade at issue. Or the
instructor might come to recontextualize the student's work as
a result of learning about personal circumstances that affected
the student's performance at the time she assigned the
student's grade.
Post-term work may or may not be relevant. Late work, if
it is taken into account, may make the student's aggregate
class performance look different, and the instructor may have
48
good reason to alter her grade. Additional work, however, may
not be relevant. Recall that a grade is not a reward for hard
work. Doing additional work, even an infinite amount of
additional work, does not itself warrant a higher grade. A
grade is an estimate of SMC. Additional work justifies an
improved grade only if it positively changes the instructor's
assessment of the student's SMC. Giving a student a higher
grade as a reward for extra effort violates the PAE.
Raising a student's grade because she has completed
additional work rightly raises questions about fairness.
Because a grade is not a reward for effort, it is not clear what
could justify raising a particular student's grade simply
because she has completed extra work. Even if an instructor
does not regard a grade change as a reward for extra work,
however, taking additional work into account at all may seem
to raise fairness or accuracy problems. Other students have
been graded based on work submitted before grades were due;
the student whose grade is being changed has not. But this is
irrelevant to the fairness of the instructor's grade-assignment
decision. Again, a grade is not a reward for effort, it is an
estimate of SMC at a given point in time. Provided all grades
submitted by the instructor reflect reasonable judgments about
SMC, a grade change made in light of additional or substituted
work need not be unfair.
Suppose the instructor comes to recontextualize a student's
work because she discovers after she has assigned grades that
the student was in the midst of a personal crisis at the time she
completed the work on which the instructor based her
judgment about the student's grade. The instructor comes to

48. Whether this is so in a given case will depend in part on the factors
considered above in relation to late work.

72

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2003

believe that the student's work does not reflect the student's
ability. This will not, in and of itself, be sufficient to tell her
what the student's actual SMC is; it will simply tell her that
she cannot trust her own estimate. Thus, recontextualization
on its own will not warrant altering the student's grade.
However, it may provide the instructor with a reason to provide
the student opportunity to complete additional work designed
to replace the work the student completed during the class in
which she earned the grade she seeks to change. On the basis
of this work, the instructor may be in a position to reevaluate
the student's SMC. If she concludes, in light of this evaluation,
that the grade she previously assigned to the student is
inaccurate, the PAE dictates that she change it. On the other
hand, the ability to respond to pressure may sometimes be a
constituent of SMC. To the extent that it is, no grade change
may be appropriate, even if the student's performance is
recontextualized.
An instructor may also come to conclude that some, or all,
of her evaluative instruments, or the way she made use of the
information derived from them, were such that she could not
accurately assess the SMC of the students enrolled in a given
course. She has no obligation to neurotically explore this
possibility.
Absent strong countervailing evidence, it is
consistent with her duties under the PAE to take her own
convenience as decisive. In some cases, though, she may
conclude that to grade accurately, she must discount some of
the instruments she has used to evaluate students in a given
course or take these instruments into account differently. If,
for instance, she gave inappropriate weight to RSEs in
determining her grades, she may realize that in so doing she
assigned inaccurate grades to a variety of students.
In
accordance with the PAE, she should have the freedom to
reconsider and revise her grades, if need be.
While the PAE requires that instructors be able to change
or convert grades at will in the interests of accuracy, it also
requires that transcript readers be informed of the dates on
which grades were changed. A student may have gained more
SMC during the period since the completion of the term when
her initial grade was assigned. If this grade is changed, the
student's transcript must make clear how much time has
elapsed between the assignment of the initial grade and the
grade change. Provided the student's transcript does make this
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clear, however, a grade change need not raise special accuracy
problems.
An instructor may sometimes be required by the P AE to
give an "I" grade if she lacks the information she needs to
assess a student's SMC. Suppose, for instance, the student
has turned in too few assignments for her to estimate the
student's SMC accurately-she cannot responsibly submit a
grade for the student. Even if she is not required to give a
student an "1," she may have sufficient doubts about her
understanding of the student's SMC to make acceding to the
student's request for an "I" reasonable. Institutional policies
should enable her to assign "I" grades, like other grades, at her
discretion.
Such policies should allow an instructor to convert an "I"
she has assigned to a student into a conventional letter grade if
she is able reasonably to assess the student's SMC. They
should not require that the "I" become an "F" after a specified
deadline. If they do, they clearly violate the PAE. An "F"
grade for a course implies that the student is incompetent with
respect to the subject matter of the course. But in the case of
an Incomplete grade, whether a student lacks SMC is
indeterminate. To imply that the student is subject matter
incompetent would be inaccurate, and therefore a violation of
the PAE. The PAE requires that the "I" designation remain on
the student's transcript until cleared.
The arguments against this position are, as usual,
consequentialist or retributivist. The retributivist will wish,
irrationally, to punish slothful students. The consequentialist
will be concerned with motivating students to perform
efficiently. It is good for students to be encouraged not to wait
indefinitely to complete course requirements. These are not
bizarre, utterly irrelevant considerations. There are genuine
costs associated with adhering to the PAE. A student already
taking a full load may be overwhelmed by the need to meet
requirements for an uncompleted course from a previous term
as well as for the courses for which she is currently registered.
The threat of an "F" may motivate her to complete her work
expeditiously. There is no way for this threat to be effective
unless it is carried out when it is made. But when it is carried
out, the instructor will be falsely declaring that she is confident
that the student lacks SMC. A continued "I" grade, by
contrast, will make clear that there is reason to be unsure of
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the student's SMC without giving transcript readers any
reason to under or overestimate it. It will also make it more
likely that an instructor will obtain the information she needs
to accurately to assess a student's SMC.
Policies that result in the automatic conversion of "I"s to
"F"s create perverse incentives for instructors. For example, if
an instructor knows that if she does not act, a student who has
received an "I" may receive an automatic "F," the instructor
may be inclined to assign the student a non-failing grade so she
will not receive an "F". However, the fact that the student has
received an "I" implies that the instructor lacks the information
she needs to adequately assess the student's SMC and is not
properly able to assign a grade. The odds are good, therefore,
that the grade she assigns will be an inaccurate measure of
SMC. Eliminating automatic "1"-to-"F" conversion rules are
thus desirable because they will eliminate the temptation
towards inaccuracy.
As noted earlier, however, it may sometimes be impossible
for an instructor to accurately assess a student's SMC after a
certain amount of time has passed. In this case, an "I" grade
might simply become permanent. Because the "I" in a given
course might reasonably be read as implying that there is still
some possibility that a grade will be assigned for the course, it
may be appropriate for institutions to assign a new
"Permanently Incomplete" ("PI") grade.

F. Academic Dishonesty
Work that is not a student's own cannot reasonably be used
to estimate her SMC. Thus, the PAE requires an instructor to
give no consideration to such work in estimating a student's
SMC. Depending on the available evidence regarding an
academically dishonest student's SMC, the instructor may be
warranted in treating the student's dishonesty as evidence that
she lacks any SMC with respect to the subject matter of the
assignment in question and is therefore warranted in giving
her a failing grade for the assignment. The PAE offers no
justification, however, for failing a student in a course simply
because she has submitted work that is not her own. If, of
course, the instructor has reasonably assigned a sufficiently
high weight to a given assignment that incompetence with
respect to the skills or understanding the assignment is
designed to measure means the student lacks satisfactory SMC
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then an "F" may be warranted. But it is warranted because the
instructor reasonably believes the student does not have
appropriate SMC and not because the student has been
dishonest.
Giving an academically dishonest student an "F" in a course
for reasons not directly related to SMC may, of course, be
defended on consequentialist or retributivist grounds. The
academic consequentialist will seek to deter students from
engaging in such behavior; the academic retributivist will seek
to punish the student for her immoral behavior. But neither
the consequentialist nor the retributivist tells the truth by
giving the student an "F" when her estimated SMC does not
warrant an "F," and the moral values both seek rightly to take
seriously are incommensurable with SMC.
One sort of exception to the general rule that academic
dishonesty does not, in and of itself, justify failure may be
available under limited circumstances. Recall that the PAE
authorizes instructors to take their own convenience
reasonably into account. It is unfair of a student who has
already given an instructor reason to be suspicious of her
honesty to expect the instructor to expend substantial extra
time assessing the exercises she submits. An instructor cannot
regard concern for her own convenience as justifying her in
refusing to make a good-faith effort to estimate a student's
SMC with respect to the subject matter of the course. But if
such an effort is rendered significantly more difficult by the
student's own misbehavior, she may be authorized under the
PAE to avoid the task of assessing all of the student's work in
order to estimate the student's SMC and the student's grade.
Suppose the instructor knows that the student has
submitted work not her own on more than one occasion.
Suppose the instructor has evidence that makes it reasonable
to believe that the student has done the same thing on other
occasions, even though she lacks proof (in such a situation the
instructor may not need to investigate every exercise-only a
representative sample). Suppose, too, that she reasonably
assumes that the student lacks SMC in many, or all, of these
cases. And suppose that the student's presumptive lack of
SMC in these cases means that the instructor lacks SMC with
respect to the subject matter of the course. In this case she
might reasonably fail the student without an across-the-board
assessment of the student's SMC, providing she could
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document her reasons for analyzing the situation as she does in
a publicly defensible way. 49
The PAE does not license an instructor to withhold all
credit for an assignment unless she reasonably believes the
entire assignment is not the submitting student's work or
cannot reasonably and conveniently determine which part is
and which part is not the student's work. An assignment only
partially a student's own work can still help an instructor to
estimate her student's SMC. An instructor is not obligated to
make special effort to determine which elements of an
assignment are and are not products of the student's work, but
if she can do so easily, she should take what the assignment
tells her about the student's work into account when
determining the student's grade. If not, of course, she is
entitled to assume that none of the assignment is the student's
work and that the student lacks SMC.
It is certainly appropriate for an instructor to require a
student who has submitted work not her own to complete
substitute work. if an alternative assignment will make it
easier for the instructor to estimate the student's SMC. An
instructor may reasonably decline to consider additional work
if doing so would cause her substantial inconvenience.
The PAE offers no justification for regarding as academic
dishonesty a student's submission of the same work in more
than one course. There is nothing dishonest about submitting
a paper to multiple instructors. If a student gives a paper or

49. The appeal to convenience here and elsewhere is not an attempt to bring
retribution in through the back door. The instructor who takes her legitimate
convenience into account in deciding not to review all of an academically dishonest
student's work need not be intent on causing the student purportedly compensatory
harm for her dishonesty. The instructor's purpose may be only to reduce her own
inconvenience; the harm to the student may be a foreseen but unintended byproduct of
her decision to minimize her inconvenience.
The distinction between intended harms and foreseen but unintended ones is
central to the so-called "principle of double effect." For a careful defense of the
distinction, see ,John R. Searle, Rationality in Action 263-66 (MIT Press 2001); on the
principle itself, see Warren Quinn, Morality and Action 175-97 (Cambridge U. Press
1993); Lucius Iwejuru Ug01ji, The Principle of Double Effect: A Critical Appraisal of its
Traditional Understanding and its Modern Reinterpretation (European U. Stud. Ser.
No. 23, Theology, Vol. 245, Peter Lang 1985); Joseph M. Boyle, Toward Understanding
the Principle of Double Effect, 90 Ethics 527 (1980); Germain Grisez, Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing, 15 Am. J. Juris. 64--96 (1970); and Jeffrey M.
Ross, Proportionalism and the Principle of Double Effect (unpublished M.A. thesis,
Graduate Theological Union 1994) (on file with Graduate Theological Union Lib.,
Berkley, Cal.).
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project to an instructor, the student represents it as her own
work; the student should not be understood to be making any
representation about the amount of effort invested in preparing
it." 0 While many institutions regard multiple submissions as
academically dishonest, it is hard to defend the judgment if a
grade is understood to serve as an accurate estimate of SMC.
Provided a paper or project genuinely reflects a student's SMC,
an instructor may not reasonably take it into account when
determining a student's grade, whether or not it has been
submitted to another instructor. A grade is not, again, a
reward for effort, so the fact that a student who submits a
paper or project to multiple instructors does not work as hard
as another is irrelevant.
An instructor might argue that she should not give credit
for a multiply submitted paper because her grades are based on
comparisons among student performance levels, and since
students in general have had less time to invest in other
projects for her class, a student who reuses a paper or project
prepared for another class has an unfair advantage over her
classmates. However, comparisons among classmates can
provide only a rough basis for grades. The instructor must be
aware of the general population of students transcript readers
are likely to evaluate, comparing her students with them
rather than with each other. The grade distribution for a class
of exceptionally gifted or exceptionally untalented students
surely ought to be quite different than the grade distribution
for a class of normal students. Provided an instructor has an
appropriate reference group in mind when she assigns grades,
intra-class comparability problems are less likely to arise.
Of course, the comparability problem also arises in a
slightly different way. A student can obviously invest more
time in a single paper or project submitted in multiple classes
than she can in either of two different papers or projects. An
instructor obviously has good reason to take this fact into
account when using a multiply submitted paper or project to
estimate the SMC of the student submitting it. Further, an
instructor may wish to take into account the amount of effort a
student has invested in the preparation of a paper or project in
SO. This is true, at any rate, absent an instructor-specific stipulation that
submission of a project or paper implies that it has not been submitted in fulfillment of
any other academic requirement. It is, of course, the appropriateness of just such
stipulations that is in question here.
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order to compare her with her classmates. But the instructor
can do so, not by labeling a student who submits a paper to
multiple instructors dishonest, but simply by asking whether a
paper has been or will be multiply submitted and giving the
information provided by the student appropriate weight as the
estimates of the student's SMC.
An instructor cannot ensure intra-class comparability by
prohibiting multiple submissions, since a student might submit
for a given class a paper never used to fulfill a requirement for
any other course which she had nonetheless written before the
class began. Similarly, a student who had never received
another instructor's formal evaluation of a paper or project
might-and should-have drawn on the critical comments of
others before submitting it for a class. Given that these
practices are not in question, it would seem inconsistent to
regard multiple submissions as inappropriate. 51
Academic dishonesty is repulsive.
It ought to be
discouraged. But it should not be discouraged through grading
practices that are themselves dishonest and unfair and fail to
respect the PAE's requirement that grades reflect SMC as
accurately as possible.
G. Extra Credit

In accordance with the PAE, an instructor ordinarily has no
reason to give extra credit work. If her evaluative instruments
are adequate, then she does not need further exercises to
determine students' SMC.
And because a grade is not a
reward for student effort or work, but an estimate of SMC, the
mere fact that a student has done additional work is no reason
for her to receive a better grade than she would otherwise have
earned. Indeed, allowing a grade to be influenced by extra
credit can result in grade inflation that makes the grade
significantly less accurate and less useful to transcript readers.

51. An objector could, of course, argue that these practices, too, should be
prohibited. But ruling out the solicitation of critical feedback on written work from
peers and other instructors would mean eliminating a valuable part of the learning
process: students often learn as much from informal conversations as they do from
formal lectures and providing commentary can be as useful educationally as receiving
it. Prohibiting the submission of written work completed before a course but not
submitted for any other seems arbitrary and appears to punish the creativity and
penchant for independent thought evinced when a student completes serious academic
work on her own
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Only if an exercise is unnecessary to the accurate assessment
of a student's SMC, but nonetheless provides information that
makes an instructor's positive evaluation of her SMC more
accurate, is awarding extra credit for its completion
.
52
appropnate.
IV. CONCLUSION

The P AE calls for instructors to grade with the goal of
telling the truth to potential transcript readers and to take
seriously the incommensurability between SMC and other
characteristics of students that become apparent in the course
of teaching and evaluating them. In accordance with the PAE,
an instructor should decline to take a student's attendance into
account when determining her grade-though she may
consider what the student says when participating in class
discussions as a source of information about the student's SMC.
She should not base her grades on activities that do not yield
outcomes she can use to estimate student performance, and she
should give more weight to examinations and papers than to
RSEs, ideally not taking RSEs into account at all when
determining grades. She may reasonably consider a student's
reflections on service-learning experiences when she estimates
the student's SMC, but she may not base a grade simply on the
student's participation in service-learning activities.
She
should, in general, avoid allowing the time a student's work is
submitted to affect the student's grade. She should be free to
make grade changes and replace "Incomplete" ("I") grades with
letter grades at any time if doing so will help ensure that the
grades given more accurately reflect her students' SMC. And
while she should refuse to consider work that is not a student's
own in determining the student's grade, she should not use a
grade as a means of expressing moral disapproval of a
student's dishonesty or as a means of encouraging student
52. This judr,rment at least raises questions about Schrag's proposal that
instructors should allow "students to earn extra credit by choosing to expend additional
effort on work that meets some minimal level of quality." Schrag, supra n. 20, at 71.
Increasing grades in response to student effort will often be deceptive and involve
attempts to commensurate the incommensurable.
As Schrag observes, until
transcripts reflect effort or other factors in addition to SMC, "the egalitarian instructor
must decide whether to give priority to supporting egalitarian justice or to avoiding
deception." Id. at 73. Of course, extra work may sometimes signal that additional
SMC has been acquired; if it does, a higher grade would obviously be appropriate.
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honesty.
Many instructors currently do things that violate the PAE.
I suggest that this reflects their probable acceptance of two
possible theoretical accounts of the logic of grading: academic
consequentialism and academic retributivism. Neither of these
approaches is plausible. Consequentialism is unworkable and
incoherent; in addition, academic consequentialism leads to
results which most academics are likely to regard as counterintuitive. Retributivism appears plausible only because of an
illegitimate transplantation of economic modes of thought into
non-economic realms of life.
And academic retributivism
violates the PAE's incommensurability requirement since it
attempts to make grades into expressions of moral judgment,
despite the fact that moral worth is incommensurable with
SMC.
Endorsing the PAE does not mean that the concerns that
lead many instructors to violate it are illegitimate. It is
important to motivate student behavior, to restrain dishonesty,
and to reduce inconvenience. But it is also important not to do
so at the expense of accuracy and fairness. Thus, in particular,
the PAE is perfectly compatible with a strategy for student
evaluation that involves retaining grades as measures of SMC
while also involving the assessment of students' effort and
character. It would be possible to note that a student was
intelligent but lazy or hardworking but a slow learner. It
would be possible to indicate that the student performed well
on examinations but wrote less satisfactory papers, or vice
versa. It would be possible to report that a student was
academically gifted but personally immature and insensitive,
inclined to making cutting remarks to others in class. Nothing
prevents an institution from attaching to a student's transcript
a notation highlighting a student's hard work in a given course,
making a transcript reader aware that she suffered from
exceptional personal stresses during a given term, or indicating
that she was academically dishonest when preparing work for a
particular course. 51 Providing such information separately

51. See Cahn, supra n. 22, at 107 n. 4; see also Schrag, supra n. 20, at 72
("fG]rades that do count effort convey misleading messages to third parties and are
reprehensible on that account from the ethical point of view. My proposal to solve this
problem cannot be adopted by the individual professor but requires institutional action,
making the effort-based policy more transparent. For example, the transcript could
indicate by an asterisk any grade earned by producing additional work not required of
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would be more useful to transcript readers than attempting to
make grades communicate diverse and incommensurable sorts
of information. 52 And it would remove the pressure on
instructors to craft arbitrary ways of commensurating
incommensurable factors when determining students' grades.
Respecting the P AE is also consistent with instructors'
legitimate self-concern; an instructor can adhere to the PAE
without inconveniencing herself excessively to accommodate
students who have been irresponsible. While an instructor
ought not to mislead transcript readers, she is not obligated to
do anything and everything possible to determine the truth.
Provided she does not use inaction for the sake of convenience
as an excuse to punish students for morally problematic
behavior, the instructor is certainly free to take her own
convenience into account when determining when extra effort
is and is not appropriate.
The P AE challenges instructors and institutions to take
accuracy seriously. It challenges instructors to grade students
in ways that will be most useful to transcript readers, and thus
most fair to students. It challenges instructors and institutions
to respect the differences between academic and nonacademic
factors. It therefore calls on them to exhibit in their grading
policies and practices the commitment to truth and fairness
that is at the heart of the academic enterprise. It therefore
provides useful guidance for institutional decision-makers. In
the limited number of cases in which courts appropriately
address grade-related issues, it may help them to think more
clearly about instructors' and institutions' policies and
practices. Of course, courts will not typically be situated
appropriately to second-guess instructors' and institutions'
grading decisions. When they decide to review such decisions,
however, the PAE may provide them with a useful basis for
evaluating the accuracy and fairness of judgments about
grades.

all students.").
52. It might even have a greater deterrent effect on irresponsible students. An
academic dishonesty notation on a student's transcript may be far more threatening to
her academic or professional future than a low grade. The proponent of the PAE can
welcome this deterrent effect even though she does not regard deterrence as itself an
appropriate basis for assigning grades.

